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The cyber threat landscape is constantly evolving with new vulnerabilities and zero-day threats. Cyber-
attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities are increasing on a global scale, leading to significant loss to the 
world economy. A common need among organisations is to share early warnings and advice about 
different types of cyber threat intelligence. Cybersecurity Intelligence Sharing (CIS) has the potential to 
help organisations to gain an overarching view of attackers’ intentions, behaviours, and tactics in order 
to define specific courses of actions in a timely manner, and ultimately to build a certain level of cyber 
situational awareness. Although CIS has been recently receiving more attention from organisations, the 
level of participation in CIS practices is not satisfactory. Besides, there is not enough information about 
the factors that are antecedent to CIS operations in an organisational context. Considering all these, this 
study proposes a theoretical model to investigate technical and non-technical determinant factors that 
influence organisations to adopt or participate in cyber intelligence sharing with their peers. Diffusion 
of Innovation (DOI) and Inter-organisational Relationships (IOR) theories are employed in a TOE 
framework to build an integrative model to better understand technological, organisational, 
interorganisational, and environmental factors in CIS.   
Keywords Cybersecurity, Intelligence sharing, Threat information, TOE framework, Diffusion of 
innovation, Interorganisational relationships  
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1 Introduction  
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in questions about how cybersecurity intelligence and 
information sharing (CIS) can help organizations including governmental agencies to mitigate the risk 
of cyber threats. A common need among organisations is to share discrete information about cyber 
attackers, victims, incidents, and vulnerabilities (Kolini & Janczewski 2015). An ultimate goal is to 
discover and disseminate solutions to these cyber threats and decrease the time between the discovery 
of  zero-day exploits or vulnerabilities when a specific course of action against those threats is initiated 
(Burger et al. 2014). Although a number of new information sharing platforms have emerged on the 
internet, it now appears that many of these platforms offer only a general cyber threat information 
without providing in-depth knowledge, accurate information, attributes of attacks, or actionable 
solutions. Moreover, in many instances, cybersecurity threat intelligence cannot be found in the open 
web due to confidentiality of this information such as personally identifiable information (PII), and 
intellectual and reputational information. For instance, in 2015 and 2016 a series of cyber-attacks 
against SWIFT payment networks were reported, with the theft of millions of dollars (Verizon 2017). 
The financial institutions which has been the target of this attack failed to share the cyber incident 
information with their peers in other banks, resulting in attackers using the same approach to 
compromise other banks across the globe. This is one instance of unsuccessful cybersecurity information 
sharing (CIS) between organisations with hundreds of millions of dollar loss and substantial 
reputational damage to the banking community.  
Existing cybersecurity research has not extensively explored the interdisciplinary aspects of CIS. To 
date, the CIS research has been mostly about the technical aspect of cybersecurity intelligence in 
organisations (Barnum 2002; Burger et al. 2014; Dandurand et al. 2013; Fernandez et al. 2012; Skopik 
et al. 2016; Brown et al. 2015). The field has yet to examine the other aspects of CIS including 
organisational, interorganisational, and environmental factors that influence an organisation to not 
participate in CIS practices. In this study, we attempt to extend our focus on the interdisciplinary study 
of cybersecurity. The interdisciplinary study draws on a variety of disciplines including information 
systems, computer science, organization and management science, and law. One of the challenges is 
grounded in the fact that interdisciplinary study of cybersecurity is complex by its nature and many 
researchers whose efforts can benefit the field are not yet aware of each other’s contributions. Thus, the 
field suffers from alike of scientific rigour and coherence that is not yet present in the field. 
Consequently, the cybersecurity field is a collection of puzzling analogies, scattered results, and partial 
frameworks. 
In this study, we shed more light into the dark side of CIS by exploring the implications of diffusion of 
innovation theory, interorganisational relationships theory, and a TOE framework to build a conceptual 
model of the antecedents in the CIS domain. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 presents the literature review and research questions. Section 3 addresses of theoretical background. 
After which we discuss the proposed hypotheses. Section 5 articulates the research method which is 
followed by the conclusion. 
2 Research Gaps & Research Questions 
In many recent studies, the notion of intelligence has often been used interchangeably with the concept 
of information or data. Although there are similarities between these terms, intelligence differs from 
information and data. In this study cybersecurity intelligence refers to verified, correlated, enriched, 
combined, and contextualized information that can be used for timely incident response or to advise  
decision makers. This definition is partially adapted from the traditional literature on intelligence where 
intelligence was presented as the collection and analysis of open, public or secret information related to 
attributes of other actors or their behaviours(Hilsman, 1952; Herman, 1966). The Carnegie Mellon 
Software Engineering Institute defines cyber intelligence as “the acquisition and analysis of information 
to identify, track and predict cyber capabilities, intention and activities that offer courses of action to 
enhance decision-making. Individuals and organisations can use cyber intelligence to reduce 
uncertainty and to draw conclusions about attributes of a cyber-attack or cyber actors, tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTP), which are not directly observable (Kolini & Janczewski 2017; Brown 
et al. 2015). For instance, cyber intelligence can be generated by verifying, analysing, correlating 
contextualizing of information that is obtained from various technological security tools such as 
Firewall, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS), Anti-Viruses, Security Incident and 
Event Management (SIEM) Systems, Data Integrity and Access Management tools, and System Logs 
(Syslog Server). 
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The complexity of cybersecurity operations has made it ultimately impossible for any organization to 
protect the cyber assets appropriately without collaboration with other entities. Therefore, a sustained 
CIS can reinforce the understanding of the cyber threat landscape and assist the sharing parties with a 
timely attack detection, response, and risk mitigation capability. Although considerable strides have 
been made in this area, there is not too much inter-organisational experience in sharing of cybersecurity 
intelligence (ENISA 2013). The key challenge here is that CIS operations required overarching 
multidisciplinary studies to understand technical and non-technical determinants that influence 
participation in CIS practices. Therefore, this research aimed to investigate the following research 
questions:  
1. How do technology, organisational, inter-organisational and environmental factors influence 
organisational participation in cybersecurity intelligence sharing between public and private 
sectors? 
2. What might explain differences in engagement in CIS operations? 
3. How to encourage organisations to participate in CIS? 
3 Theoretical Background 
3.1 Technology, Organisation, Environment (TOE) Framework 
Building upon the TOE framework, which posits that IS-related decisions are influenced by three broad 
categories-Technology, Organisation, and Environment- which collectively impact innovation adoption 
and use in organisations (Depietro et al., 1990). In contrast to many other IS theories, the TOE 
framework does not offer a robust theoretical background to establish causal relationships. However, 
the TOE’s simplicity and the breadth of attributes motivate IS researchers to decompose and combine 
these attributes with other IS theories (Mishra et al., 2007). Following this framework, we aim to 
investigate factors that holistically capture the relevant state-of-the-art in the domain of Cybersecurity 
Intelligence Sharing (CIS). This research project argues that public and private sector engagement in 
CIS operations will not only be influenced by technical determinants and organisational, inter-
organisational, and environmental factors are needed to be considered equally important for 
investigation and analysis. 
Technology in this context may refer to infrastructure, tools, and protocols that are selected on the 
technical layer and set into operation by adaptor firm. Hence, it is essential that selected technology fit 
into existing technologies and is compatible with organisational processes and operating model. 
Organisational context can be denoted by internal characteristics of a firm that might impact 
participation in CIS. A number of organisational characteristics such as management support, 
organisational strategies, culture, size , operational costs, quality of human resource have been 
scrutinised by IS scholars (Kelly et al. 1999; Tornatzky & Fleischer 1990; Chau & Tam 1997; Zhu & 
Kraemer 2005)) will also be considered for research project. The environmental context refers to the 
characteristic of the external environment in which public and private firms operate. Previous studies 
in the cyber domain have shown that the influence of international institutions such as CERTs or NATO, 
as well as the legal and regulatory requirements (Kolini & Janczewski 2017) cannot be ignored. Since 
this study primarily aims to understand what factors contribute to participation in CIS, our proposed 
model does not seek to investigate interactions between elements in our proposed theoretical model. We 
acknowledge that while such interaction is conceivable, our immediate purpose at this stage is to 
investigate important direct effects of combined TOE framework, diffusion of innovation theory (DOI), 
and inter-organisational relationships theory (IOR) on CIS. 
3.2 Diffusion of Innovation (DOI) Theory  
An organisational innovation can be defined as a technology, structure, process,  practice, new vision or 
behaviour new to the organisation adopting it (Roger & Shoemaker 1983; Swanson 2004 ). Diffusion is 
the process by which an innovation spreads among different organisations (Wang 2010). Since  the 
adoption of cooperative information sharing capabilities require new technologies, processes, and 
resources and incur economical cost, CIS operation is still scarce among organisations (Hausken 2007). 
Thus, this study is an initial attempt to investigate the factors that encourage organisation in the 
adoption of new technologies for CIS practices. Roger and Shoemaker (1983) identified five different 
attributes that influenced the adoption of technology innovation in organisations. These elements 
include relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, observability, tractability. Other studies found 
that noted that cost, Image, and voluntariness are other attributes which are not considered by Rogers’s 
study (Tornatzky & Klein 1982; Moore & Benbasat 1991). Since DOI theory emphasized on the 
technological aspects as well the internal and external characteristics of an organisation (Rogers 1995), 
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it can be appropriately combined with the TOE framework to study technology or organisational factors 
that influence CIS operations. This approach is consistent with the extant literature (Kuan & Chau 2001; 
Zhu et al. 2006; Lin et al. 2008). 
3.3 Inter-organisational Relationships (IOR) Theory 
Another determinant that can influence the CIS operations is the formation of relationships and 
collaboration between various organisations. While intelligence sharing can enable organisations to 
benefit from coordinated and timely incident responses, there is no significant effort placed on such 
inter-organisational collaboration (Robinson 2012). We perceive that in order to better understand 
factors that contribute to an effective inter-organisational CIS collaborations, we may need to investigate 
attributes that are required to maintain sustainable relationships among organisations. Previous studies 
suggested that sharing of all types of knowledge or information, including cybersecurity information, 
required complex interactions between participating organisations because of key differences in their 
culture, value or origins (Yang & Maxwell 2011). Bouchard (1993) pointed out, an organisation’s attitude 
towards engagement in collaborative operation is based on what their business partners are doing and 
not the characteristic of innovation or technology. In an effort to integrate underlying determinants of 
IOR’s literature, Oliver (1990) proposed six types of contingencies that are central to the formation of 
relationships among organisations. These six contingencies included necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, 
efficiency, stability and legitimacy. 
Since CIS has offered certain operational effectiveness, benefits, and values for organisations (Johnson 
et al. 2016), IOR theory can be used as an appropriate lens to understand the contingencies that motivate 
organisations to enter into relationships for the purpose of CIS operations. Furthermore, understanding 
these factors can help governments to incentivise public-private partnerships in management and 
protection of cyber-critical infrastructures. 
4 The Research Model and Hypotheses Development  
In this section, we propose our research framework and hypotheses by synthesizing the TOE framework, 
diffusion of innovation (DOI) theory, and Inter-organisational relationships (IOR) to investigate the 
factors that influence organisational participation in CIS. We drew upon the TOE framework to posit 
that the non-technological factors in CIS practices including organisation, inter-organisation, and 
environment should be considered equally important as technological requirements. A typical goal of 
cyber intelligence technology is to establish a platform with multiple sources of intelligence, enriching 
and combining data, and finally delivery of aggregated intelligence into organisational workflows and 



















Participation in CIS 
Figure 1: Research Framework
 
4.1 Technological Factors  
4.1.1 IT Compatibility and IT Complexity  
We drew upon DOI theory to specify that complexity of cyber intelligence operations and compatibility 
with organisational IT systems are among factors that influence CIS operations. While complexity refers 
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to the degree to which participation in CIS with other organisations is perceived to be a complex 
operation, IT compatibility focuses on perceived compatibility of existing IT systems, protocols and 
standards with CIS requirements. To cope with the growing amount of data that needs to be handled in 
a complex cyber intelligence operation, human resources are not sufficient anymore. Therefore, IT 
systems that enable automation of a cyber intelligence operation are fundamental for CIS practices. 
Several technical standards including MITRE’s STIX, CybOX, and TAXII (Barnum 2012), ITU’s CYBEX 
(Rutkowski et al. 2010), or NATO’s CDXI (Dandurand & Serrano 2013) are currently used by agencies 
and organisations. However, compatibility of infrastructure, software, and communication protocols of 
these standards with the organisation current technology is crucial in participation in CIS (Skopik et al. 
2016). Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H1a: Perceived complexity of CIS operation will have a negative effect on organisational 
participation in CIS. 
H1b: Perceived IT compatibility will have a positive effect on organisation participation in CIS. 
4.1.2 Confidentiality and Data Quality  
Information confidentiality refers to organisation’s sensitive information or personally identifiable 
information (PII) that disclosure of which can result in financial loss, reputational damage, or legal 
action (Johnson et al. 2016).Sharing of cybersecurity intelligence such as security logs, scan results or 
IP addresses may expose personal information or defensive capabilities of an organisation. 
Organisations should implement data classification and handling standards to actively anonymize or 
remove any information identifying the source of information shared with other organisations. Murdoch 
(2015) posited that anonymity and data handling could encourage participation in cybersecurity 
collaboration. Gil-Garcia (2005) and Landsbergen (2001) suggested that information privacy and 
confidentiality are significant issues for inter-governmental collaborations. 
The quality of information is another key requirement for CIS operations. For instance, increased 
productivity, accuracy and timeliness of collected intelligence, reduced duplicate data collection, and  
increased relevancy of information are among those benefits that can be achieved by participating in CIS 
operations (Gil-Garcia et al. 2007; Brown et al. 2015; Robinson 2012). Considering all these, we present 
the following hypotheses: 
H1c: Perceived confidentiality and anonymity of information will have a positive effect on 
organisational participation in CIS. 
H1d: Quality of cyber intelligence information will have a positive effect on organisational 
participation.  
4.2 Organisational Factors  
4.2.1 Economic Costs 
Economic cost refers to perceived potential costs of participating in CIS operations. The cost of CIS is 
primarily related to infrastructure, communication, operations and human resources costs. Although 
some studies suggested that CIS can offer some economic advantage (Gal-Or and Ghose 2005; Robinson 
2012), other major studies advocated that there are significant constraints in respect to the feasibility of 
cost contribution, especially when the benefit of such operation is not well-defined (Gil-Garcia et al. 
2007; Fan et al. 2014; Lips et al. 2011). Hence, 
H2a: Economic costs of CIS will have a negative effect on organisational participation in CIS 
operations. 
4.2.2 Management Support  
Top Management support denoted the commitment of senior management and key stakeholders by 
providing vision, guidance, and resource to initiate and sustain participation in CIS (Akbulut et al. 
2009). Top management involvement can encourage organisations for the adoption of IT systems and 
platforms that are required for CIS initiatives (Grover 1993). Hence, we can propose: 
H2b: Senior management support and commitment will have of positive effect on organisational 
participation in CIS. 
4.2.3 Process Capability 
Organisation process capability refers to the availability of operating procedures and knowledge within 
an organisation that could facilitate participation in CIS. Many organisations developed and owned their 
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distinct operating models, procedures, and work flows, which can impede engagement in CIS operation 
(Yang and Maxwell 2011). Since the adoption of a cyber-intelligence-based operations is relatively new 
in organisations, diverse maturity levels are expected from organisations. In a mature organisation the 
cyber intelligence is the process by which intelligence strategy, process, and objectives are embedded 
into the organisational structure (Brown et al. 2015). This type of organisation may participate in CIS to 
manage the flow of valuable cyber intelligence and feed them into their organisational process to help 
decision maker and practitioner. As a result, we can argue that:  
H2c: Organisational process capability will have a positive effect on participation in CIS. 
4.3 Inter-Organisational Factors  
4.3.1 Inter-organisational Trust 
The literature suggests that inter-organisational trust is an enabler for information sharing across 
organisations. Hart and Saunders (1997) articulated that trust provided an agency with an optimistic 
anticipation of the benevolent behaviour of another entity in inter-organisational relationships. In 
cybersecurity, Vazquez and Brown (2012) identified two key components of trust in CIS operation: trust 
in the CIS network, and trust in other participants as their relationships strengthen However, Inter-
organisational trust can be attenuated in the case of information misuse, loss of autonomy, and lack of 
secure communications (Faerman et al. 2001). Based on the extant literature we propose that:  
H3a: Inter-Organisational trust will have a positive effect on organisation participation in CIS . 
H3b: Trust in CIS network will have a positive effect on organisation participation in CIS with 
other organisations. 
4.3.2 Reciprocity 
The IOR theory pinpointed that interagency reciprocity is one of the elements that can build inter-
agency relationships. In Literature reciprocity denotes as cooperation, collaboration, and cooperation 
among organisations rather than organisational domination, control, and power. Besides, reciprocity 
can be achieved for the purpose of the pursuing common or mutually beneficial goals or interests (Oliver 
1990). In order to achieve the desired effect of early warning and improved detection of cybersecurity 
threat reciprocity is an important factor to enforce information sharing among organisations(Rak 2002; 
Constant et al. 1994). 
An important enabler of reciprocity is the commitment of organisations to bilateral and multilateral 
cyber information sharing operations. At this stage engagement in CIS operation is completely voluntary 
and, therefore, a contractual obligation is not present to define and enforce the minimum CIS 
commitment requirement. For instance, in many instances public and governmental organisations do 
not stand by their CIS’s commitment due to confidentiality concern. Therefore, we posit: 
H3c: Perceived reciprocity of information will have a positive effect on organisation 
participation in CIS. 
4.4 Environmental Factors 
4.4.1 Reputational Risk 
Reputational risk often arises as a result of loss resulting from damage to an organisation’s reputation.  
There are several risks associated with CIS primarily due to disseminating valuable cybersecurity 
intelligence to another organisation. Once this information has been shared by an organisation, there 
would be no full control over the propagation of this information with other parties, which may result in 
damage to the reputation of an organisation (Akbulut 2009). Furthermore, since this information is 
highly sensitive, it might result in privacy issues and consequently severe reputation risks. Considering 
all these points, we perceive that: 
H4a: Reputational risk will have a negative impact on organisational participation in CIS. 
4.4.2 Legal and Policy Framework 
Previous studies suggested that legal and policy frameworks either have a positive influence on the 
sharing of information or create barriers for inter-organisation information sharing (Gil-Garcia & Pedro 
200; Yang and Maxwell 2011). The concern that disclosure of cyber-breach may lead to legal action 
against an organisation participating in CIS  is a significant barrier for CIS operations (Robinson & 
Disley 2012). Legal liability is another challenge that may impede collaboration in CIS. At present, It is 
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not clear whether it would be an increased legal liability for an organisation that has received Cyber 
intelligence but has not applied it (Haass et al. 2015). Thus, we propose that 
H4b: Legal and policy framework uncertainties will have a negative effect on organisational 
participation in CIS. 
4.4.3 Image 
Drawing on the DOI theory the image refers to the degree to which use of an innovation, in this case 
participation in CIS, is perceived to enhance an organisation’s image in a social system (Moore & 
Benbasat 1991). Roger (2010 subsumed the image as an aspect of relative advantage. However other 
researchers (Tornatzky and Klein 1982) found the effect of the image is different from relative 
advantage, therefore, it can be investigated as separate attributes. Since there are still significant 
concerns around laws and legislation that could preserve citizens’ privacy and confidentiality, 
organisations who engaged in sharing of cybersecurity information will be received more affection from 
public and society.(Clarkson et al. 2007). Therefore we presume that: 
H4c: Concern over public image of organisation will have negative effect on organisation 
participation in CIS with other organisations. 
5 Research Design 
This study employs a quantitative study designed to test the theoretical model of CIS through the 
evaluation of TOE factors that may influence organisational participation. We will design a data 
collection instrument, where the constructs will be operationalised using measures form validated 
instrument. The selected instruments are modified to fit with this research design. The target recipients 
of the survey are  organisational employees who are responsible for cybersecurity practices across the 
organisation. We also plan to conduct a pilot study to evaluate and refine the measurement instrument. 
Since data collection and statistical analysis will be conducted at the organisational level, the unit of 
analysis will be an organisation. In order to validate this study instrument, we will examine construct 
reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity for all designed constructs. Moreover, we will 
measure the common method bias by using Herman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We will 
apply a structural equation modelling (SEM) for measuring the statistical significance and regression 
analysis. 
6 Conclusion 
Most other studies investigate the technological constraints that influence sharing of 
cybersecurity, therefore, this study aimed to adopt a broader TOE framework to investigate 
non-technical factors including organisational, inter-organisational and environmental factors 
that potentially influence CIS operations. Drawing on DOI and IOR theories we have designed 
our theoretical framework which will be examined through quantitative study. To our best 
knowledge, this study is one of the first attempts to explore cybersecurity intelligence sharing 
at the organisational level. Moreover, we seek to identify factors that impede organisational 
participation in sustained cybersecurity intelligence sharing practices. Among other 
contributions, this study aims to add to the body of literature on multidisciplinary 
cybersecurity research. One potential limitation of this study is that we did not consider the 
individual expectation of CIS operations in our proposed model. We assume that 
organisational factors would have a strong influence in shaping employees attitude towards 
CIS operation (Yang & Maxwell 2010). Hence, we intentionally exclude them from this study. 
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